The Truth: Hurts.

Senior Investigating Officers make hundreds of decisions, most of which are actually of very little consequence.  Of the few that do really matter, some are surprisingly easy.  At least I suppose that many others will be surprised  that they are really what seem these days to be called ‘no brainers’. 

A strangely frequent no brainer is whether to secure some evidence of a serious crime in circumstances where it is obvious that the admissibility of that evidence might at some later date be called into question.  My thinking in these situations was pretty swift, and went along these lines:  If we don’t get the evidence now, we might not ever get it.  It won’t then be available at court.  If we get it but it is challenged, the learned Judge might exercise discretion against us, and we might lose it.  It won’t then be available at court.  But he or she might just let it in, and we will have it.  So let’s get what we can, and then let the court decide - the worst that might happen is that we end up in the same position we would have been in had we not secured it.  There is nothing to lose.  At least that was how it seemed.

But this thinking relied upon two principles which we took for granted, but which the shameful treatment of Detective Superintendent Steven Fulcher has now called into question.  First, our criminal justice system eschewed the American doctrine of ‘the fruit of the forbidden tree’.  Essentially, evidence which was obviously correct, which pointed to an incontrovertible objective truth, was admissible even if procedure had not been followed in unearthing it.  So a search without reasonable suspicion, without a warrant, even an irregular interview, were of no consequence if they yielded sound evidence.  Jurisprudentially, the concept of objective truth was accepted and it trumped whatever procedural niceties the Judges’ Rules or then the Police & Criminal Evidence Act threw up in the path that led to it.  Secondly we, the SIOs, knew that our first duty was to the community we served, and that we could justify decisions as being faithful to that duty without fear for our reputation, career or pension.  Which is how it should of course be, unless we want those who take the decisions in major investigations to be putting themselves before the people they have sworn to serve.

The awful and unwarranted predicament in which Steven Fulcher now finds himself has cast serious doubts on all this; doubts which have terrible implications for us all.  When confronted by a self-confessed murderer telling him of the location of a further victim, Mr. Fulcher had to take a decision.  But it was a no brainer.  He could comply with PACE, return to the station, and commence an interview, at some point after a solicitor had been summoned, advice given and the tape machine switched on.  If, as the result of advice, or a change of heart, “no comment” was the result, the opportunity to find a body, to resolve a case and most importantly to let a family know what had really happened to a loved one, would have been lost.  The alternative was to carry on, to strike while the iron was hot and allow the admission to be made and the body to be found.  On the basis that, if the suspect were to indicate the spot and the body to be found, it was pretty self-evident that the suspect knew a great deal about it, an objective truth would have been uncovered and the lack of strict procedural correctness therefore judged irrelevant.  Which is what Steven Fulcher did, and which – I hope – any SIO worthy of the name would have done.

I can just about understand the Judge’s ruling that the evidence of the second murder is inadmissible.  I do not agree with it, however I am sure he was applying the law faithfully as he saw it.  But what I cannot fathom is the decision - presumably taken by the top team within Wiltshire Police - to suspend Steven Fulcher and call in the IPCC.  Because SIOs are going to take note and inevitably factor their own career prospects in to similar decisions in future, to the detriment of victims, their families and the community.  Which will equally inevitably mean bodies not found, crimes not solved and victims not satisfied.

Police Officers who take money, who falsify evidence, who are too lazy to act, who use excessive force – these are the ones who should be suspended, investigated and dealt with.  Those like Steven Fulcher, who do the best they think they can, honestly, in a considered manner and prioritising the interests of victims and the community, should be applauded, not suspended.

The pen is mightier than the sword

Or, updating the adage for the 21st century, the computer is mightier than the gun.

Arming every officer, even if it were logistically possible, even if they were all suitable (which it isn't, and they aren't) would not prevent tragedies such as we saw yesterday. Policing is a risky business at the sharp end, and where a madman does things so far off the scale of reasonableness and predictability the risks are impossible to eradicate.  And to alter the essential character of our policing to such an extent in the hope that it might help is, sadly, simply not worth it.

But what we must do, what the leaders of our Police Service are duty-bound to do, is to take every possible step to make sure that our policing of our communities by consent is safe.  In this context that means making sure that every single piece of information and intelligence which might help inform officers attending every call for help is available to them and those who direct them.

There is a long-standing issue with the dissemination of information gleaned from major investigations, which few forces, if any, have come to terms with.  Typically, a force will have three computer systems relevant to this issue - Command and Control, which logs calls for help, who is responding, how the incident is dealt with and the result; an intelligence database where information, graded for reliability, is kept in cross-referenced indices with entries relating to persons, vehicles, premises and locations; and the HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) database upon which every piece of information relating to major investigations is kept in discrete accounts.

The Command and Control system has a facility whereby as an incident log is created any flags attached to the address entered will be displayed.  These may relate to the occupiers or the location and are essential for the dispatching officer to make an informed decision as to the risk to officer safety.  In some forces these flags still have to be entered manually whilst in others information will be copied across from the intelligence system automatically.  But of course even in the latter cases, manual entry on to the intelligence system is required, so there is a dependence on somebody, somewhere, deciding that the information is worth recording.  The ultimate systems might be where the Command and Control logs themselves automatically write back to the intelligence system, but the issues of duplication and data standardisation here are proving difficult to overcome.

At a divisional level intelligence staff are pretty good at updating the Command and Control database. But it all becomes a bit murky when you start to try to include HOLMES. Culturally it has taken some years to arrive at the position where detectives investigating the most serious of crimes have accepted the necessity to put everything they do, see, hear and take possession of on to 'The System', that is, to record it on the HOLMES database. The additional burden of separately submitting an intelligence report for the different database seems to have been taken on only by the more conscientious and far-sighted officers.  Despite repeated efforts it has not been possible, to my knowledge, to arrive at a reliable means of achieving the automatic transfer of information from HOLMES to an intelligence database, certainly not in a foolproof and operationally sound way. So we are left to rely upon the judgment of individual intelligence officers attached to major enquiry teams, who have as a priority the gathering of information for dissemination to their team and perhaps understandably therefore are frequently too busy to push information out from the team to the wider force in any comprehensive or reliable manner.  I doubt there is a Senior Investigating Officer past or present who has not wrestled with this problem, tried to address it but ended up uneasy that it has never really been solved.

Why is all this relevant?  Because the fact that there is a vast mass of useful intelligence lying dormant in HOLMES accounts across the country means, generally, that opportunities to solve or prevent crime, and to mitigate risks to officers, are not available to those who would like to take advantage of them.  Because, I fear, it is very likely that despite the huge external and internal publicity generated by Greater Manchester Police in the hunt for Cregan, there will be information in the HOLMES account that would have led to his capture had it been available to a wider audience. Or, more devastatingly perhaps, which would have linked Cregan somehow, maybe through a few degrees of separation, with the house in Abbey Gardens.

This piece is written not to criticize nor carp, but rather to offer a suggestion at a time when all of us, especially those who have worn the uniform, are hurting. It is extremely difficult, extremely unpalatable.  But it would be some additional respect to the memories of Fiona Bone and Nicola Hughes if their painful loss were to inspire each and every police officer and staff member to ensure that every conceivable snippet of information they acquire is shared as widely as it can be. Computers, not guns, ought to be giving our dedicated frontline officers the increased safety they deserve, but as ever, they can only be as good as the information they are fed.

The Enfield Crime Squad. Allegedly.

Allegedly. Was the word really even in common use before Have I Got News For You? I'm not sure it was, and I am equally sure that it is not one I have regularly had recourse to. But that was then, and this is now. One of the difficulties in commenting from afar rather than knowing from the thick of it is that I have to rely on information which I cannot completely verify. So all of this post is, as usual, what I think, but what I think in this case is based upon things I have heard and been told, but which I do not know for sure to be accurate. So just think 'allegedly' before you read each paragraph and we should be fine.

It was only a few years ago, maybe 10 or 15 at most, when Enfield, the Borough of my birth and childhood, was treated with a little disdain within the Police. Those of us fortunate (!) enough to work in the tougher neighbouring Borough of Haringey thought they had it easy there. No real crime, no real public order, nice people who made you cups of tea. Didn't the main radio set in Yankee 5 have a snooze button?

As inner London's problems migrated ever-outwards, after the turn of the century it became obvious that there were no soft Boroughs in the Met any more, and Enfield was no exception. What had been a cosy posting for years suddenly became populated by gangs, robbery and violence. As the Borough rose to the top of the Met's murder charts Edmonton became known as 'Shank Town', while one street earlier this year was still rejoicing in the nickname 'Stab Alley'.

Somebody within the local police presumably thought enough was enough, that the growing gangs and rising crime rates were unacceptable and that tough action was required. How this was devised and 'operationalised' (see - I learnt some spectacular made-up words in the Met) I am not sure, and is pretty much irrelevant. The outcome was that the Borough Crime Squad was, by 2009, the most successful in the capital. Its arrest and conviction rates were high, crime rates were falling. Robust and effective enforcement, combined with practical cooperation with the local authority to prevent crime, was slowly turning the tide and making the Borough a palpably better place to live and work in.

The senior officers in Enfield were apparently aware of the Crime Squad's methods and gave at least tacit approval to them. And why wouldn't they, given the successful results? There was no question of anything illegal taking place, and certainly no question of personal enrichment or gain for the officers involved. They were, it has been suggested to me, a bunch of good young coppers, working hard to put away criminals and make their Borough a safer place.

One of their more unusual practices was to use property seized from their criminals. There is no suggestion this was for any purpose other than to make their jobs easier - for example, seized vehicles may have been used to conduct observations from, mobile phones used within the office to make covert or unattributable calls, TV sets to view CCTV recordings. Essentially, goods which might ordinarily have sat in a storeroom or compound pending a trial were used to help the fight against those who had stolen them, or bought them with illicit funds.

Now somebody took exception to this. Reports have described her or him as a 'whistleblower'. I think this is unfair and misleading. Most of us will understand that term as a co-worker reporting malpractice. That is far from what happened in Enfield; it seems that to a man and woman the operational officers and staff within the Borough were supportive of the Crime Squad - and why wouldn't they have been, given the real benefits the community was deriving from them. The so-called whistleblower in this case was, it seems, a support-worker from a central department outside of the Borough, who decided to tell their own boss about it, for either personal or professional reasons.

This led to an investigation which found very little evidence of wrongdoing, and was petering out when it was decided to search the Crime Squad's base (as well as the homes of 14 officers). It was this search, in February 2009, which uncovered the now infamous 'hard-stop' video from some 8 months previously. An incident about which, I believe, no complaint of malpractice was made at the time by the young criminal who was the subject of the arrest. With renewed vigour the honorary Detectives of the Met's Directorate of Professional Standards set about building a case, and went to interview a number of criminals who the Crime Squad had convicted. One of these alleged that his head had been held over a sink of water during his arrest, though video footage of the arrest seems to show him completely dry throughout. This allegation, somehow, was leaked to the media - possibly through somebody connected with the Metropolitan Police Authority - as 'waterboarding' and the whole thing gained an unexpected and unwarranted momentum.

Around this time also the Crime Squad received an anonymous tip-off that a lock-up garage had a stash of stolen goods. They rightly got a warrant and indeed discovered a veritable Aladdin's Cave. All the electrical gear was properly seized, and enquiries to trace its owners began. This proved pretty simple, as there were serial numbers and other markings which quickly led the officers to a hire company, who were as bemused by the enquiry as the officers were by their reply. The equipment wasn't stolen, indeed it was all being leased by the Metropolitan Police - from an address where many of the D.P.S. teams are based. Presumably this ham-fisted attempt at a sting had been intended to prove the corruption of the Crime Squad officers. Instead, I am told, since they had properly recorded all the goods and then proceeded to try to trace their owners, it just proved their honesty.

I have no idea how much the lease of this stash of electric gear cost, but it is presumably a drop in the ocean in the context of the overall cost of the investigation into the Enfield Crime Squad. Figures bandied in the press today range between £5 million to more then £12 million. And while we may not have heard the last of it, all it seems to have uncovered is a few officers whacking a car - which had been stolen in an aggravated (that is, with weapons and/or violence) burglary, in order to arrest the driver who had at least dishonestly handled the car, and was driving whilst disqualified.

Which they shouldn't have done with baseball bats - though presumably if they had used officially-issued batons or asps would have been OK. I say that because one has only to watch one of the plethora of 'PoliceCameraActionTrafficCopsWithCameras' programmes on any number of Freeview channels any evening of the week to understand that it is a common tactic used by officers at the end of pursuits. And perfectly lawful and justified, we are told, because of the need to shock the driver into instant submission before the car, or indeed any other object, can be used as a weapon. Which is presumably what one might expect an aggravated burglar to do, that being the sort of person the officers had every reason to suspect to be driving the car.

So, a little 'over-aggressive' (the Met's own words) policing is discovered at this huge cost. I have enough family and friends, outside of the police, who still reside in Enfield to gauge the feeling there. They were mightily glad that such robust and decisive policing was going on in their community. I imagine the practices have been changed somewhat; I don't know how Enfield's crime and detection figures are looking as a result.

But what I do know is that we are staring, pan-London and indeed nationally, at a reduction in police numbers due to budgetary constraints. It is a reasonable approximation to call the annual cost of a new Constable £50,000 when one adds up salary, training and equipment. Which means we could get 100 PCs for £5 million or 240 PCs for £12 million. Makes you think, doesn't it? Allegedly.

It's about more than just cuts

This post is too long for a tweet, but may be quite short for a blog. I just want to present an idea of a different perspective on the police cuts debate.

Overall, I am a supporter of cutting public expenditure; there is no alternative given the horrible state Messrs. Brown and Darling left us in. And I have some notion of equality which says that what needs to be done must be done without exception, the police included.

That said, I do not want to see policing quality reduced - I am not sure how far it can fall anyway whilst still being worthy of the name. I quite understand the associations, commentators and Opposition MPs seizing the opportunity from the last week's events to make a case for stopping the cuts but I have little faith they will succeed. Or at least there is a distinct opportunity that they won't.

Why not then also have a Plan B; using the same facts, the same public opinion and the same fear as to the future to campaign for something which might be much more achievable. That would be shifting the focus from palliatives to prosecutions, from counselling to conviction - indeed, using what became a dirty word in policing around 15 years ago, but one used in the House by David Cameron today, from Service back to Force.

This, I think, would include, but not be limited to:

• Restoring the right of a Custody Officer to authorise charges - saving thousands in CPS lawyers' wages and ensuring that many more of the guilty actually face a court

• Strict guidelines on when a criminal can be cautioned - and how often

• Repeal or wholesale modification of the our Human Rights Act - not, as promised by the Government, trying to get it changed at source by amending the ECHR - to prevent some of its perverse effects

• Removing all targets for detections, which skew activity away from what might be needed

• Exempting Police Forces from the provisions of the Health & Safety legislation, reversing the dreadfully paralysing effects of the Met's corporate conviction

I am sure there are many other measures which would help, these are rather off the cuff, but you get the idea.

Essentially, the Government, Opposition and certainly the public as a whole are asking for more robust policing. Those in the fortunate position of being able to lobby at this time should not be blinkered by the cuts. Concentrating solely on them gives the Associations the appearance of a Trades Union, concerned with the well-being of their members above all else. Police Officers are better than that; they should grab the chance to make a real difference to policing - and thus to the communities they serve - so that some lasting good can at least be born out of the terrible last few days.

Just like 1981? Yes a bit, but mostly No.

It was meant to be my long-weekend off as a young PC at Tottenham. It was July 1981. My leave was cancelled because the tough and unpopular measures necessary to correct the nation's financial plight caused by the previous Labour Government's mis-management had sparked riots. At least that was the official reason; to many it looked like opportunistic acquisitive crime. So perhaps there really is nothing new under the sun. But let's look back through my memories of that day in a little more detail.

At about 8pm, as the Grey-Green 52-seater - containing 20 or so coppers and an impressively gung-ho driver hired along with his vehicle - crossed the Seven Sisters Road by Finsbury Park Station we all heard the crash from our right. A set of step-ladders protruded from the smashed window of Unwin's off-licence in Station Place, and we could see at least half-a-dozen figures in the shop filling pockets and bags with spirits and cigarettes. But tonight was going to be different. The rioting which had continued across towns and cities for four or five days was about to stop. Whether it was pressure from their exhausted foot soldiers below, or their political masters (well, mistress ultimately) above, our leaders had instructed us to play harder, to meet force with force, to take any and every prisoner.

It wasn't pretty. Truncheons drawn, we entered and the resistance we encountered received some savage retaliation. Nine men were arrested; every stolen item - none of which had actually made it out of the store - was recovered and accompanied its thief. As the prisoners were loaded on to the coach they continued to struggle; officers continued to beat the futile resistance from them.

Shortly afterwards I sat in the charge room at Holloway Police station, taking personal details from my prisoner, a 30 year-old Jamaican whose name I remember to this day. He had lost his shoes, his shirt and the shape of his nose in the battle. He was bloody from head to toe, front and back. Though I knew I hadn't caused any of his numerous and very visible injuries, something in me wished I had. Despite having been enjoined never to tolerate any other officer touching my prisoner, I knew the situation - not just here, but across the country - needed extreme measures of such a nature that this young, inexperienced and essentially peaceable officer had neither the confidence nor the courage to effect. But I also knew how frightened I had been, for myself, for my colleagues and my city, and was intelligent enough to know that something had to be done.

Then every police officer in the crowded room stood up. I followed suit and saw a tall, impeccably smart man in the uniform of a Commander, cap on, swagger stick in hand. His gaze fell on my prisoner, I saw him take in every detail of the man's bloodied body. The Commander came over and asked, "Is this your prisoner, Son?" I almost simply nodded, but not wanting to add to my difficulties by being disrespectful, replied, "Yes, Sir" - as confidently as my sinking heart would let me. "Burglary, looting an off-licence" I added quickly, hoping rather than expecting that this would at least justify the arrest. He smiled just a little, placed his brown-gloved hand on my shoulder and said, "Well done, well done," with a warmth which was as welcome as it was unexpected.

The next morning it was a Saturday court at Highbury Corner. From the previous night's rioting there were 42 in-custody prisoners charged with burglary, theft, danage and assault. There was one Stipendary Magistrate, who cleared the whole list in slightly over 90 minutes. My man was typical in that he pleaded guilty and was immediately sentenced to a couple of months imprisonment. No social enquiry reports, no adjournment for the Probation Service to interview him, just go to jail. Get off our streets, all of you, if you cannot behave - that was the unmistakeable message. The tide had turned, the community was fighting back, through those appointed and paid to protect them, and protect them we did. Violence was met with violence and crimes, all crimes, were met with prosecution and swift justice. The belief was that the rioters, quite simply, didn't want a fight and didn't want to go to prison.

Sadly, it is evident that neither of these dissuading factors is easily available to our officers today. First, watch the helicopter footage on the TV. Watch how ponderous the police response seems to be, waiting until the the 'dynamic risk assessment' allows action. Wait for the shields, the crash hats, the Tasers. A much-respected Commander in the 1990s used to conclude briefings saying, "The Metropolitan Police is into participative management, but it has no place in a public order situation". Where we once had quick decisive and instinctive leadership we now have decision by committee, by numbers and manuals, slow, cautious decisions made by managers scared stiff of being second-guessed after the event.

Secondly, as we have seen in other public disorder situations, notwithstanding the seriousness of the circumstances, the Police cannot offer violence back now without an uproar, an IPCC inquiry, a trial even. CCTV, mobile phone videos and 24 hour news will all be available to those who have an agenda to prevent the police taking the necessary robust action. The masked men and women, and more especially those who support them as a matter of principle, insist anonymity cuts only one way, and they disseminate their knowledge so usefully as evidenced by this London flyer.

But most significantly perhaps, our over-sophisticated, defendant-biassed, lawyer-enriching and victim-neglecting Criminal Justice System just cannot move with the speed the situation demands. A CPS lawyer, cautious to adhere to the myriad rules and guidance - laid down by those who professed to be tough on crime - will need statements, forensics, further enquiries and a 'realistic prospect of conviction' . This will require our rioter to be released on bail pending further enquiries - provided of course that the lawmakers and law-interpreters have decided that Police can bail suspects after all - before any charge is laid. The rioter will of course have Legal Aid, and almost certainly be advised not to plead guilty at he first appearance. I doubt the court would deal with four cases in 90 minutes, let alone 40.

So, combine an over-stretched, under-funded and under-trained Police Service with politicised, partial scrutiny on an unprecedented scale, mix in an excessively bureaucratic and risk-averse CPS and put it all within the context of our 21st century risk-assessing, H&S worshipping, backside-covering police leadership and what do we get? 215 rioters arrested, almost 90% of them not charged. A teenage rampage with police powerless to prevent them, powerless to control them and clueless as to how to regain the streets for the communities they claim to serve.

Whence come you?

'More resources' for the hacking enquiry were recommmended by the Select Committee, has this translated into 15 more detectives? Probably not, it is much more likely this is a Met decision in light of the increased number of enquiries being made of the Weeting team, and would probably have happened whatever the committee report had said. So can we expect to see more?

To investigate the whole hacking business properly is an immense task; and properly is how it must now be done. That means exploring lines of enquiry which would not normally be followed. The difficulty is that, in normal circumstances, large investigations will often be constrained by what is practicable. Where many offences are disclosed a management decision will regularly be taken to restrict the enquiries (and hence the resources needed) to just enough necessary to prove the scope of offending, and to attract a suitable punishment. There is no other way, normally, to manage the investigation and also the ensuing trial. An indictment can become simply too large and complicated for a jury to consider. Were it not for such sensible decisions serial offenders like Levi Bellfield and Delroy Grant would be on trial for most of the next ten years - assuming the investigations were completed in their lifetimes.

You notice, though, that I keep using the word 'normally'. Very exceptionally the context of an investigation changes, and it becomes desirable not only to convict the guilty but also to prove publicly that enquiries have been thoroughly and completely carried out. While the original hacking enquiry might have started out as 'normal', the ever-increasing storm of the last two weeks means that Operation Weeting is now very firmly in the 'exceptional' category. It simply will not do for any stone to remain unturned, no possible offence to be missed. So every one of the 4000-odd names will be looked at to see if any attempt was made to hack their voicemail, and if so, each one will be investigated as a separate offence - undoubtedly many victims will have been hacked several times, each one a new offence. So the total number of crimes to investigate might well be into four figures, and it is hardly any wonder that 45 officers have so far managed only to speak to 170 or so victims. Franky that is quite good going . Never mind 8 hours, it will be amazing if this is wrapped up in 8 months.

So how might more resources be found? The Government could throw some money the Met's way, and as welcome as it might be in these straitened times, it won't be the complete answer. There is a limit to how much overtime officers can perform before becoming tired, stale and less effective. The answer must be more officers, but not just any old (or more accurately, young) cop will do. The expectation ought to be that experienced detectives are used, and the only two areas of the Met with those officers with numbers sufficient to be able to stand significant abstractions are the Murder Squads and Counter-terrorism. Of course the Murder squads already have an entire team struck off for the Madeline McCann review, and who knows what work is ongoing within Counter- terrorism? While both Commands may be relatively under-stretched at the moment, as we know all too well that situation can change virtually overnight. I am sure there is no greater priority in the Met at the moment than hacking - nor should there be, as a complete, transparent and successful resolution of that investigation is crucial to the process of rebuilding trust and confidence in the Met; essential if that wonderful but all too-often flawed organisation is to recover from what must be its lowest point for 40 years.

But in amongst all this, I wonder how fair it is on Londoners. The Met has traditionally taken on some national functions, notably protection of the Royal Family, as well as getting involved in other ad hoc issues in which it has no geographical interest - the McCann review, for example. Is the hacking investigation really a matter just for the Capital? Leaving aside the slightly esoteric and ultimately irrelevant debate as to where online or other telecoms-based offences actually take place, aren't the victims spread across the country and therefore several police boundaries? Isn't the whole thing anyway now one of national interest and importance? Perhaps the pain ought to be shared more widely, perhaps the additional resources the Select Committee called for should be drawn from other forces, so that other commitments in London are affected less and any that arise in future can be met without affecting the Weeting team.

It is perhaps an attractive solution, but one which the Met I knew and loved would resist on the basis it wanted to sort out its own mess. That attitude might be laudable, were it based upon a genuine desire to make amends rather than a degree of arrogance. But I think the current state of its reputation demands a new, more open and more humble, approach.

Yes Sir, No Sir, Two bags full Sir.

I know John Yates well enough to consider him shrewd, decent and honest. I would have thought him the last person to be unconvincing before a Select Committee, but for the first and quite probably last time in find myself in complete agreement with Keith Vaz. (Incidentally, do you agree that having Mr. Vaz in charge of an investigation into corruption is at the same time astounding and brilliant?)

I had expected AC Yates to have been firm, eloquent and impressive. What we saw and heard was none of these things, so I have tried to work out why. The alternatives posed by most as this incredible tale has unfolded have been the traditional choice of 'cock-up or conspiracy'. But finding the former out of the question and the latter very difficult to believe of him, I have looked for a third way, and it just might be - and I sincerely hope I am correct - that it is a combination of the man's decency and the current Met culture of apology without blame, to which I have alluded in past blog posts.

To understand this possibility one must take a realistic view of how these investigations, even the most high-profile ones, are conducted. Very few of the operational decisions are made by the figurehead ACPO officer, even 'Yates of the Yard'. Instead they are reported to by junior officers on all but the highest-level strategic issues. They must trust their officers, of course, and will question and probe to ensure they are happy with progress, but they cannot and do not look at every document, every statement, themselves. If they did, why have the junior officers anyway? Given the back-covering environment in which police officers are forced these days to operate it is inconceivable that the decisions and their supporting reasons are not documented. Every investigation has a policy log, and when the officers who surely advised John Yates that there was no further mileage in the hacking inquiry did so, their reasoning would have been there in black and white, or at least an email or several.

So when he said in his weekend interview that he shouldn't, as an Assistant Commissioner, be expected to sift through two binbags of evidence himself, he was quite correct. But somebody should have, and I suspect somebody else decided not to, or at least not to ask a few Detective Constables to do so.He or she then took a punt, and assured the Boss that there was nothing in there. If John Yates is to appear convincing - for his own sake and that of the Met he must – he will have to bite the bullet and explain, in detail, naming names and producing documents. However distasteful this may be to a man of integrity and who treats his juniors with the utmost respect, it is the only way forward; in such dirty fashion lies the only way properly to come clean.

Because the blame cannot be pushed to News International, no matter how obstructive or uncooperative they might have been. John Yates is good enough a copper to know that, surprise surprise, criminals tend not to cooperate, not to confess and not to hand over evidence on a plate. And never two binbags full. They lie, cheat, hide and destroy their tracks and it is up to the investigators, despite all this, to find the proof and make sure justice is served. The notion that somehow News International ought to be above that, particularly in the context of this whole affair, is, I am afraid, as naïve as it is unconvincing.